On the Nature of States

Weerasingha observed that all states reduce to three forms: rule by one, rule by a few, and rule by many. Moligoda, who wrote badly and thought well, added the distinctions that make the observation useful.

I have promised to spare Your Grace from the agony of reading Molligoda. Cows wandering over rice fields have written better sentences by accident in the mud; in a just world, Molligoda would have been hung, drawn, quartered, beaten thoroughly and then kept on bread and water for six weeks. Since we exist in an unjust world, it falls to me to sum his thoughts into a readable form.

Of the Sources of Legitimate Authority

The first question to ask of any state is why its rulers are permitted to rule. Seven answers present themselves.

The first answer is divine right, where legitimacy descends from a god, from the blood or words or acts of a god; the ruler’s authority is not of this world and cannot be contested on this world’s terms without first contesting the god. Such states have power insofar as the god is willing to intervene in affairs.

The second is aristocratic legitimacy, where authority belongs to a hereditary class and derives from birth rather than deed or appointment; the ruler rules because of what she is, not what she has done. It is typically the custom for members of this class to take for themselves such instruments as allow them to propagate their power through their progeny.

The third is elective legitimacy, where the ruler has been chosen by a vote. In such cases her authority extends precisely as far as those who voted for her are willing to tolerate. Such states have power as long as the majority of votes are cast in favor.

The fourth is plutocratic, where wealth is itself the claim; those who hold enough of it hold authority as a natural consequence, and challenges to their rule are understood as challenges to property. A careful observer may note that while this behaves similarly to aristocratic legitimacy, plutocracy is more fickle; one may lose her wealth or grow it, and thus there is more movement within such ranks.

The fifth is militaric, where legitimacy derives from the capacity for violence, whether personal or commanded; this is the most legible form of power and the most unstable, since a stronger force always exists somewhere. It is well-said that those who live by the sword die on it. However, one must note that almost all revolutions and upheavals involve a militaric component; there exists no state today that ignored its ability to exert violence and survived unharmed.

The sixth is systemic, where rulers are produced by a structure — a religion, a bureaucracy, an examination, and suchlike. Here power lies not in the person but the structure; the system legitimates the ruler, and the death of a prominent figure will be of no great hurdle as long as the system is capable of producing more.

The seventh is meritocratic, where authority is conferred by great deeds or by passing tests that the governed have agreed shall confer merit. This is the most common beginning for any movement, but is the most fragile of the seven, since merit is always subject to re-evaluation, and those who conferred it can always find reasons to withdraw it.

Your Grace will observe that most states claim one form of legitimacy while operating on another. This is cleverness; by claiming one, a state distracts from the weaknesses of the other. Divine right is asserted most loudly by those whose military position is weakest. Meritocratic claims are advanced most vigorously by those whose hereditary claims are contested.

Of the Scope of Power

The second question is how much power the rulers actually hold. Here there are three conditions.

The first condition is absolute power. Absolute power imposes no legal or constitutional limit on authority; the ruler may do what she will, and the only check is practical — resources, the will of others, and suchlike. There are limits to states built on such authority; beyond a certain size, authorities find the need to delegate, lest the minutiae of every decision overwhelm them; and with such delegation comes a distribution of power away from the center.

The second condition is legal power. Legal power is granted and bounded by a set of laws; the ruler operates within a structure that all are agreed to be bound by. Legal power provides the ruler with the greatest safety, as all are bound equally; but to maintain the ability and reputation of a legal system requires diligent effort. A state whose laws are subverted, ridiculed, and challenged will find that its rulers, too, are treated the same way.

The third is communal power, granted and limited by the community itself, through decision and consent. It is the most responsive to the governed. Yet it is the most difficult to exercise decisively, for leaders are made such for a reason, and the common man does not possess the ability or knowledge with which to understand the levers of power.

Your Grace should note that states also mislead others about the scope of their power. A state that calls itself absolute and has no army to enforce that absolutism is a legal state at best. A state that calls itself legal but settles dissent through arms is a militaric state in paper clothing. The greatest example of such subversion is no doubt Singhapura, where the Adiraj nominally holds absolute power, but from everyday function to wartime decisions are the warrant of many parties, and many tensions have to be managed.

Of the Organization of States

The third question is how the state is organized.

A unitary state concentrates authority at the center and delegates downward; local powers exist at the center’s sufferance and can be revoked. Unitary states must be carefully managed, because their greatest strength — a center — also forms their greatest weakness. If the center cannot hold, such states fall quickly.

A federal state distributes authority between regional governments and a central one, with responsibilities formally separated, but under a shared framework of law and order. This gives a measure of resilience, as long as the various states are in good standing with each other. The difficulty is that the line between them is always contested. Regions that gain more power will challenge the center; regions that lose power may be a drain upon the state.

A feudal state grants power over land to local rulers who owe in return military service, taxes, and whatever else the granting authority has negotiated. Feudal states are the most durable structure under conditions of poor communication, and especially during times of war, where laws and courts often become polite suggestions. However, such states inevitably collapse as times change and the central authority consolidates power.

The first task in any new state is to determine the answers to these three questions. I may make so bold as to suggest Your Grace always have two answers ready: one which Daub can claim, the other which is the intended reality. Of such ingredients are the strong made.