On the Nature of States

Weerasingha observed that all states reduce to three forms: rule by one, rule by a few, and rule by many. Moligoda, who wrote badly, added several distinctions; put together, this forms the basis of much political discussion in Singhapura. Though I dare say it does not represent the leading edge of thought, it nonetheless presents a useful scaffolding.

I have promised to spare Your Grace from the agony of reading Molligoda. Cows wandering over rice fields have written better sentences by accident in the mud; in a just world, Molligoda would have been hung, drawn, quartered, beaten thoroughly and then kept on bread and water for six weeks. Since we exist in an unjust world, it falls to me to sum his thoughts into a readable form.

Of the Sources of Legitimate Authority

The first question to ask of any state is why its rulers are permitted to rule. Seven answers present themselves.

The first answer is divine right, where legitimacy descends from a god, from the blood or words or acts of a god; the ruler’s authority is not of this world and cannot be contested on this world’s terms without first contesting the god. Such states have power insofar as the god is willing to intervene in affairs.

The second is aristocratic legitimacy, where authority belongs to a hereditary class and derives from birth rather than deed or appointment; the ruler rules because of what she is, not what she has done. It is typically the custom for members of this class to take for themselves such instruments as allow them to propagate their power through their progeny.

The third is elective legitimacy, where the ruler has been chosen by a vote. In such cases her authority extends only as far as those who who are ruled are willing to tolerate. Such states have power as long as the majority of votes are cast in favor.

The fourth is plutocratic, where wealth is itself the claim; those who hold enough of it hold authority as a natural consequence, and challenges to their rule are understood as challenges to property. A careful observer may note that while this behaves similarly to aristocratic legitimacy, plutocracy is more fickle; one may lose her wealth or grow it, and thus there is more movement within such ranks.

The fifth is militaric, where legitimacy derives from the capacity for violence, whether personal or commanded; this is the most legible form of power and the most unstable, since a stronger force always exists somewhere. It is well-said that those who live by the sword die on it. However, one must note that almost all revolutions and upheavals involve a militaric component; there exists no state today that ignored its ability to exert violence and survived unharmed.

The sixth is systemic, where rulers are produced by a structure - a religion, a bureaucracy, an examination, and suchlike. Here power lies not in the person but the structure; the system legitimates the ruler, and the death of a prominent figure will be of no great hurdle as long as the system is capable of producing more.

The seventh is meritocratic, where authority is conferred by great deeds or by passing tests that the governed have agreed shall confer merit. This is the most common beginning for any movement, but is the most fragile, since merit is always subject to opinion and re-evaluation, and those who conferred it can always find reasons to withdraw it.

Your Grace will observe that most states claim one form of legitimacy while operating on another. This is cleverness; by claiming one, a state distracts from the weaknesses of its true mode. Divine right is asserted most loudly by those whose military position is weakest. Meritocratic claims are advanced most vigorously by those whose hereditary claims are contested.

Of the Scope of Power

The second question is how much power the rulers actually hold. Here there are three sorts. Commonly, states rely on one more than the others.

The first is absolute power. Absolute power imposes no legal or constitutional limit on authority; the ruler may do what she will, and the only check is practical - resources, the will of others, and suchlike. There are limits to states built on such authority; beyond a certain size, authorities find the need to delegate, lest the minutiae of every decision overwhelm them; and with such delegation comes a distribution of power away from the center.

The second is legal power. Legal power is granted and bounded by a set of laws; the ruler operates within a structure that all are agreed to be bound by. Legal power provides the ruler with the greatest safety, as all are bound equally; but to maintain the ability and reputation of a legal system requires diligent effort. A state whose laws are subverted, ridiculed, and challenged will find that its rulers, too, are treated the same way.

The third is communal power, granted and limited by the community itself, through decision and consent. It is the most responsive to the governed. Yet it is the most difficult to exercise decisively, for leaders are made such for a reason, and the common man does not possess the ability or knowledge with which to understand the levers of power.

Your Grace should note that states also mislead others about the scope of their power. A state that calls itself absolute and has no army to enforce that absolutism is a legal state at best; a state that calls itself legal but settles dissent through arms is a militaric state in paper clothing. The greatest example of such subversion is no doubt Singhapura, where the Adiraj nominally holds absolute power, but from everyday function to wartime decisions are the warrant of many parties, and many tensions have to be managed.

Of the Organization of States

The third question is how the powers of the state are organized.

A unitary state concentrates authority at the center and delegates downward; a single body of law and a single sort of order exists across the whole; local powers exist at the center’s sufferance and can be revoked. Unitary states must be carefully managed, because their greatest strength also forms their greatest weakness. If the center cannot hold, such states fall quickly.

A federal state distributes authority between regional governments and a central one, with responsibilities formally separated, but under a shared framework of law and order. This gives a measure of resilience, as long as the various states are in good standing with each other. The difficulty is that the line between them is always contested. Regions that gain more power will challenge the center; regions that lose power may be a drain upon the state.

A feudal state grants power over land to local rulers who owe in return military service, taxes, and whatever else the granting authority has negotiated; outside of these borders, local powers are free to do anything within their power. Feudal states are the most durable structure under conditions of poor communication, and especially during times of war, where laws and courts often become polite suggestions; however, such states inevitably collapse as times change and others consolidates power.

Of Utility for Daub

We now come to the use of these thoughts in examining Daub.

The first question: why is Your Grace permitted to rule?

The honest answer is meritocratic. Your Grace rules because you have demonstrated the capacity to rule: records kept, intelligence maintained, a reputation for fairness and the ability to keep certain forces in check, and thus to ensure that daily life functions without much upheavel.

This is the most common beginning for any new authority and the most fragile of all foundations. A single visible failure, such an a political enemy who prospers, or a crisis met with hesitation, may cause those who praised your competence to discover, with remarkable speed, that they had reservations all along. Personal relationships will only go so far.

The public answer should, of course, be the meritocratic one, since it flatters both Your Grace and those governed. But Your Grace should be in the business of building toward systemic legitimacy, especially into the institutional arrangements of the city. Courts and the administration of order and justice are a good beginning; as are transactions and contracts and public works; in such a manner, Your Grace builds a structure that supports your command and resists change on your behalf.

The second question is: how much power does Your Grace actually hold?

Tgus is best answered by distinguishing the claim from the practical reality. There is legal claim - Charter Knights, courts, formal arrangements and treaties. This has its uses; it invites the governed to understand Your Grace as bound by law, which is reassuring; it makes your decisions legible and your enemies’ violations of them scandalous.

But Your Grace should not mistake the claim for the condition. In practice, the scope of your authority is wide because it has not been seriously tested. The Merchants Guild has not yet found it worth their while to contest you openly; the nobles of Allant’s installation have not yet coordinated, nor have the displaced focused their greatest efforts on Daub; Singhapura has not yet decided what to do with you. This kind of wide power thus presents many untested points at which one may fail, similar to a castle wall built too thin and broad. I advise Your Grace to treat the legal claim as a public instrument and to spend some interval making that wall narrower, but stronger.

The third question is: how is the state organized?

This admits an answer that may bring little comfort. By aspiration, Daub is unitary: a single center,with Your Grace’s order extending through every district. By inheritance, Daub is feudal: lords legitimized by Wattle, the Church and the Temple, a Merchants Guild that is yet growing, and suchlike. This is a defensible position only if Your Grace understands that it is temporary. Feudal arrangements endure where communication is poor and armies are slow; as roads improve and merchants grow richer and Singhapura pays closer attention, the conditions that make this ambiguity tolerable will erode. Your Grace must make real the unitary state before anyone notices that it is not.

From this it follows that Your Grace should always have two answers ready for the three questions. The public answer: a meritocratic ruler, exercising legal authority, over a unified city. The working answer: a systemic authority under construction, a practical absolutism maintained by the balance of competing powers, and a feudal fragmentation that is being managed by your hand.

Rukarya, the political theorist, called Daub’s lack of tradition dangerous; he meant that without custom to check it, its energies could turn in any direction. I would suggest he was half right. Tradition is also a constraint, and those who inherit old states inherit old quarrels with them. Your Grace governs a city that has not yet decided what it is, which means Your Grace has the unusual privilege of deciding for it.

Folio XIII · Of Provinces

Transcribed by Victor Konara